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TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS
-TWO RECENT CASES
Th*e idea that a charitable institution is not liable for the torts of its employees arose years ago in England. The case which established the principle was
overruled by the same court about ten years after it had announced the rule, but
the evil of the case was not interred with its bones; it exists today in many jurisdictions. It has been rationalized by the courts today in various ways with various
results. Some courts boldly state that the funds of a public charity are a trust
fund created by donations for strictly charitable purposes and that if the charity
would have to pay for the negligence of its employees, there would be a depletion
of the funds and a frustration of the purposes of the donors. Under such a view,
if it is strictly followed, no-one who is injured by the charity may recover. This
seems to be the view taken by the courts of Pennsylvania. In the case of Siidekum,
Admr., v. Animal Rescue League1 the supreme court of that state said,
"No distinction has been made in our courts, as it has been in other
jurisdictions, between cases where the injured person was a beneficiary
or employee of the charity and those where-he was a total stranger
to its activities."
and
"The fact that a charitable organization charges for some of the work
performed by it for persons able to pay does not militate against its
status as a charity; many charities derive income from compensation for
their services."
But even in Pennsylvania there is one exception to the rule. That exception exists
where the charity is running a business which is not charitable in order to derive
money for the charity, and in the prosecution of that business commits a tort. In
this situation liability exists.2
And
The courts of most states have found the trust fund theory distasteful.
8 the court
Parish
Peter's
St.
v.
Jewell
of
case
the
in
instance,
for
so in New Jersey,
stated,
"What we are dealing with here is a doctrine whose designed effect is
the frustration, in certain cases, of claims for damages, notwithstanding
the validity of the claims otherwise, and without reference to aught that
touches the merits of either the claimant or the claim. Certainly a thing of
that kind should not be loosely applied."
The courts of New Jersey have decided that the true basis of the immunity should
be public policy. They therefore "deny the right of recovery on the part of those
Liable For Tort In Pen.
1 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d 59 (1946). See Williams, Public Charhies Not
jylvania, 54 DICK. L. Rnv. 6 (1949),
2 Winnemore v. Philadelphia, 18 Pa. Super. 625 (1901); School Dist., Etc., v. City of Philadelphia, - Pa. -, 79 A.2d 433 (1951).
a 10 N. J. Super. 229, 76 A.2d 917 (1950).
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who have a valid claim against a charitable institution based upon actionable
negligence, but who are either the recipients of the benefactions, or the beneficiaries of the charitable institution sought to be held liable; but permit the right of
recovery against charitable institutions, for their actionable negligence on the
part of those unconcerned in and unrelated to that which the donor brought
into being. 4 This idea of public policy is then the rule in New Jersey. Therefore
when I take my child to a charitable hospital as a paying patient, and as a result
of the negligence of a nurse in failing to remove a hot water bottle, my child
suffers second degree burns, I have no right to recovery against the hospital. 5
However, once that happens and I hire a nurse or some person not connected
with the hospital to come in and give my child extra care, this nurse may recover
from the hospital if she is hurt in some way by the negligence of the employees: 6
All this is is based on public policy! In this respect a recent case in New Jersey
should be noted. 7 In this case the plaintiff had paid admission in order to attend
a church social. The plaintiff claimed that she was injured by a faulty stairway
and, at trial, the defendant moved for a summary judgment as a matter of law
relying on its immunity. The court, in refusing the motion, stated,
"There is nothing whatever in the facts before me to show a relation
between the parties here beyond that resulting from plaintiff's payment
of the required fee for the privilege of participating in a 'social activity'
-What this gives to the plaintiff is not the status of defendant's beneficiary-, but rather the status, if anything, of defendant's patron."
However, the court added,
"Needless to say, the result would be different were plaintiff's presence
upon defendant's premises at the time of the claimed injury shown to bear
relation to the church's primary function, not accidentally only."
It is rather difficult for one to read these cases and discover just what the public
policy is which underlies them, but, at any rate, that is the basis upon which liability is predicated in New Jersey and some other states. 8
Another theory evolved by the courts in order to get away from the disastrous
results brought about by the trust fund theory is the implied waiver theory. Under
this view at least one New York court has come to conclude that a paying patient
in a hospital may recover damages from the charity.9 The basic idea here is that
upon accepting gratis the benefactions of the charity with knowledge that its
assets are not available for tort claims the recipient waives his right to a tort
claim. How this would apply to an infant is beyond comprehension, and it is
difficult to see why a charity would only answer to those financially responsible
4 Rose v. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., Etc., 136 N. J.L. 553, 57 A.2d 29 (1948).
5 Woods et al. v. Overlook Hospital Ass'n., 6 N. J.Super. 47, 69 A.2d 742 (1949).
6 See note 4.
'7 Jewell v. St. Peter's Parish, 10 N. J. Super. 229, 76 A.2d 917 (1950).
8 Hinman v; Berkman et al., 85 F. Supp. 2 (Mo. 1949); Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo.
436, 196 S. W. 2d 615 (1946) ; Moore v. Moyle, 405 Il.555, 92 N. E. 2d 81 (1950).
* Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital, 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 832 (1946).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEWV

VOL 55

and cast the needy aside. Yet this is the basis in some states and is used as an extra
reason in others. 10
Another reason which is often given for the isolation extended to charities
is the statement that tht doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in such
a case. Under such a view it is plain that the only logical conclusion that could be
reached by any court accepting this view would be one which excludes all liability
for the torts of the employees. However, some courts seem to indicate that the
inapplicability of the doctrine only applies to one benefited by the charity and a
stranger to the charity could maintain the action;" other courts apply it in all
cases. 12
The reasons for the announcing of such a doctrine are worth examining. In
18
one case it was stated,
"The immunity of the property of a charity from sale under execution
rests on special grounds. The property of a corporation organized solely
for charitable purposes is exclusively dedicated to public uses.-If the
doctrine of respondeat superior is applied to them (the trustee of the
charity) it follows that along with their other powers they possess an
implied power to destroy, by a willful violation of their duties, by
collusion, or by negligence, the public interests that they are selected to
preserve. The doctrine that the principle of respondeat superior has no
application to this class of cases when the trustees willfully abuse their
authority, and that it does apply in a single species of negligence, would
seem to be merely the result of another effort to find a compromise."
It must be noted here that in many states where the doctrine of immunity is applied, the charity may be held liable if the trustees were negligent in selecting the
employees, 1 4 or if they furnished materials which were faulty.' 5 However, the
above language shows that a logical application of the doctrine of respondent
superior cannot be found in such a case, or does it? At any rate there is much authority to be found stating that liability may be based on the above grounds. One
thing is clear. If the policy is strictly one to protect the funds paid in to the
charity, then there could be no logical recovery in such a case. Other courts have
propounded other reasons for not applying respondent superior. One that is truly
unique may be found in Southern Metodist Hospital and Sanatorium v. Wilson. 10

There the court concluded that the doctrine of respondeat superior was one con10 New York law seems to treat private and public hospitals the same as regard paying patients.
Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium - App. Div. -, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 385 (1950). Ct. Gordon
v. Harbor Hospital, Inc., 275 App. Div. 1047, 92 N. Y. S. 101 (1949). As to other charities the
case of Bernal et al. v. Baptist Fresh Air Home Soc., 257 App. Div. 88, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 488 (1949)
should be noted since no mention was made of the doctrine there.
1 White v. Providence Hospital, 80 F. Supp. 76 (D. C., D. C. 1943).
12 Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 92 P. Supp. 140 (Ark., D. C. 1950).
18 Fordyce v. Woman's Christian Nat'l. Library Ass'n., 79 Ark. 550, 96 S. W. 155 (1906).

14 See note 11 and the Gordon case in note 10.
15 Medical & Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Couthorn, 229 S. W. 2d 932 (Tex., D. C. 1949);
but compare S. M.'U. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S. W. 2d 749 (1943).
16 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P.2d 118 (1935).
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ceived due to a sound public policy, that it was a special type of liability having
proper public objectives as its end. On the other hand, the court continued, the
non-liability of a charitable corporation is also founded upon a public policyalso sound. Therefore, when the two face one another, the doctrine of respondeat
superior will not prevail.
The cases throughout the United States are neither uniform nor reconcilable.
Each time a court is faced with the problem it either writes an extensive opinion
discussing the rules and rationalizing the rule applied in its state or it economizes on
space and merely quotes the rule of the state in which the tort took place. There has
been a tendency on the part of the courts to get away from the rule and to impose liability upon charitable institutions. But like old soldiers rules of law seldom die;
they merely fade away. Maryland has been faced with the problem and, although
7
the court felt the rule was wrong, it stated,'
"The principle that charitable corporations are free from tort liability has
long been a basic part of the law of this state.-There are special
reasons why the doctrine of stare decisis should be adhered to in this
case. To withdraw immunity from this type of corporation at this time
would be an act of judicial legislation in the face of contrary policy declared by the legislature itself."
The court was referring here to a Maryland statute 8 which provides that the insurer of a charitable corporation is estopped in a suit against it from asserting
as a defense the immunity of the corporation. This gives rise to another curious
result reached by many courts.
The fact that the charitable corporation carries insurance protecting it from
loss in such a case is, as a general rule, of no effect on the doctrine of immunity. 19
Undtr the trust fund theory one must do a lot of figuring to reach such a
result. But one could say that since some of the fund was being diverted to pay the
premiums, this is an impairment of the trust fund. Such an approach is unrtalistic.
A realistic approach to this problem has been recently made in two dtcisions.
The first was Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont.20 In this case
the plaintiff fell on the ice and snow which had gathered on the defendant's walk.
The defendant, in its answer, set up the immunity as its sole defense. The plaintiff
demurred and the lower court overruled the demurrer. On appeal, the appellate
court said,
"--we should decide this case upon the broad question, namely: Is or is
not a privately conducted charitable institution liable for injury caused
by negligence? We are satisfied if we should not do so, we would start
17
18
19
v.
20

Howard v. South Baltimore Gen. Hosp., 62 A.2d. 574 (Md. Ct. of App. 1948).
68B of Art. 48A, Acts 1947, ch. 900.
Hinman v. Beckman et al. 85 F. Supp. 2 (Mo., D. C. 1949). See also note 1. Compare Moore
Moyle, 405 111. 555, 92 N. E. 2d 81 (1950).
116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950).
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this Court along a highway that would soon be shrouded in a fog of doubt
from which it would be difficult to emerge into the sunlight of legal
certainty."
It was obvious from this that the court had studied the cases from other jurisdictions. In sustaining the demurrer the court added,
"There is no sufficient reason under a sound public policy requiring
this Court to say that an individual be deprived of his right to recover
from such an institution because its funds are derived from a charitable
minded public.-A charity should not be permitted to inflict injury
upon one without redress in order that it may do charity to others. The
result would compel the injured person to contribute to the charity against
his will.
Private charities are much different now than when the liability
question was first before the courts. Then they were largely small
institutions-. Today they have become, in many instances, big businesses, handling large funds .

..

It is idle to argue that donations for

them will dry up."
Here is real concreteness for jurisdictions still allowing the immunity. Here are
arguments which cannot be answered by a court looking to reality. The theories
discused above lack this vitality. It is time for courts to reexamine this doctrine
of immunity.
And that is what was done in Haynes v. PresbyterianHospital Ass'n. 21 There

the Supreme Court of Iowa was faced with the following situation. First, a line of
cases which granted immunity to charities on the basis of public policy. Second, a
man before the court who had been injured due to the negligence of employees
of this charitable institution. The trial court, relying on the prior decisions, had
dismissed his petition, and he had appealed to them. Were they to apply the
doctrine of stare decisis and leave this injured man in suffering? Or would they
re-examine their decisions in the light of present day conditions? The Supreme
Court of Iowa chose the latter alternative. They first stated that all of the theories
except public policy were mere fictions; public policy must be the basis for the
immunity if there is to be any immunity. Then they stated,
"Public policy simply means that policy recognized by the state in determiniig what acts are unlawful or undesirable as being injurious to
to the public or contrary to the public good. It is not quiescent but active.
A policy adopted today as being in the public good, unlike the Ten
Commandnants, is not necessarily an ever enduring thing. As times and
prospectives change, so changes the policy

. .

. No doubt, at the outset

of the theory, the need for charity was urgent and the general good
of society demanded encouragement thereof...
Today, the situation is vastly different. The hospital of today has
grown into an enormous business. They own and hold large assets,
It -

Iowa -

, 43 N. W. 2d 151 (1950).

1951

397

NOTES

we take
much of it tax free by statute, and employ many persons
judicial notice of the extensive use of the many types of hospital insurance, as well as liability insurance by the institutions . . . it is
evident that times have changed . . . (and) the basis for, and the need

for, such encouragement is no longer existent."
Here is clarity. The court is to be commended for their straightforwardness. They
did not hedge, but rather they faced the problem squarely. Why should my rights
be determined on the basis of who injured me? Why should a large institution
be allowed to hide behind an ancient, floundering doctrine even though protection
can be bought by them for a nominal sum? There is no answer to these questions
except that given by these courts. As the problem arises in jurisdictions where
immunity is still the rule, the courage of the Iowa Court should be seriously
considered before a decision is made; and when the problem arises in jurisdictions
where it has not yet been considered these decisions should be given the weight they
so rightly deserve in the present day world.
John Woodcock, Jr.

